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Abstract
Currency crises of the past decade highlighted the importance of balance–sheet eﬀects of
currency crises. In credit–constrained markets such eﬀects may lead to further declines in
credit. Controlling for a host of fundamentals, we ﬁnd a systematic decline in foreign credit to
emerging market private ﬁrms of about 25% in the ﬁrst year following currency crises, which we
deﬁne as large changes in real value of the currency. This decline is especially large in the ﬁrst
ﬁve months, lessens in the second year and disappears entirely by the third year. We identify
the eﬀects of currency crises on the demand and supply of credit and ﬁnd that the decline in
the supply of credit is persistent and contributes to about 8% decline in credit for the ﬁrst two
years, while the 35% decline in demand lasts only ﬁve months.
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11 Introduction
Emerging market currency crises of the late 1990s were generally accompanied by a substantial
decline in economic activity in aﬀected countries (Gupta, Mishra, and Sahay, 2003; Hutchison
and Noy, 2002). Much of the literature attributes a large part of this decline to currency–related
balance–sheet problems that arise when ﬁrms that have borrowed in foreign currency ﬁnd their net
worth falling after a large depreciation of domestic currency. The literature has shown that these
balance–sheet eﬀects can lead to a contraction in investment.1 A popular view seems to be that
this decline in investment is driven by a credit crunch; indeed, Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006)
show that the recovery from ﬁnancial crises tends to take place without a recovery in credit.
While the reduction in credit following currency crises is frequently discussed, the empirical analysis
of this phenomenon is scarce. Desai, Foley, and Forbes (forthcoming) show that after a currency cri-
sis, domestic ﬁrms suﬀer from decline in credit, while multinationals expand their activity. Blalock,
Gertler, and Levine (2004) present evidence consistent with21 the credit crunch after the 1998 crisis
in Indonesia. We contribute to this literature by systematically analyzing the eﬀects of currency
crises in the past 25 years on credit provided to emerging markets’ domestic private ﬁrms by for-
eign creditors.2 In addition to documenting the qualitative decline in foreign credit to emerging
markets’ private sector, which represents over 30% of total foreign credit to emerging markets,3 we
provide quantitative analysis of the size and the duration of this decline.
Documenting the decline in credit, however, is not the same as identifying a credit crunch. A
credit crunch implies that ﬁrms are interested in obtaining loans but are unable to do so, that is,
the decline in credit due to a contraction in credit supply. Nevertheless, some of the decline in
credit could be due to a reduction in ﬁrms’ demand for capital. To our knowledge, there is no
systematic evidence on the eﬀects of currency crises on the demand and supply of foreign credit to
1Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001), Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2004), Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco
(2003).
2We focus on emerging markets because the exchange rate movements appear to be more destabilizing in developing
countries than in industrial countries (Shaghil, Gust, Kamin, and Huntley, 2002). We have no access to ﬁrm–level
data on domestic lending; however, we include foreign borrowing by ﬁnancial sector in our study, thus analyzing total
availability of foreign capital to the country’s private sector.
3See, for example, Chapter 4 of the Global Development Finance, The World Bank, 2005. According to Chapter
4 of the Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2005, about 25% of emerging markets’ corporate bonds and
bank credit are external, and this number is much larger for Latin American emerging economies.
2emerging–market private ﬁrms. This paper provides such an analysis.
The “original sin” literature argues that most emerging market borrowers cannot borrow abroad
in their own currency;4 as a result, they may accumulate large foreign–currency liabilities. If
the asset side of these borrowers’ balance sheets is denominated primarily in local currency, a large
depreciation of the local currency leads to a large reduction in a company’s net worth and potentially
to solvency problems. Thus, according to the standard credit rationing argument (Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990; Mason, 1998), it is natural to expect that foreign lenders
would reduce the supply of credit to these borrowers. This would lead to a ﬁnancial accelerator
eﬀect (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) and deepen the economic downturn after a currency crisis.
There are reasons to believe that ﬁrms will also lower their demand for credit in general and
for foreign credit in particular. First, the decline in aggregate demand that accompanies currency
crises would increase ﬁrms’ inventories and reduce their demand for credit. This decline in aggregate
demand will mostly aﬀect the ﬁrms that sell their products domestically. Exporting ﬁrms, on the
other hand, will experience an increase in their foreign currency revenues relative to their operating
costs, which are denominated mostly in domestic currency.5 Thus, their earnings will go up and
they may be inclined to demand less credit. Finally, ﬁrms might decide to reduce the currency
mismatch on their balance sheets and increase their borrowing in domestic currency. Since they are
unable to do that on foreign capital markets, they will increase their demand for domestic funds
and reduce their demand for foreign credit.6
Using ﬁrm–level data on foreign bond issuance and foreign syndicated bank loan contracts for 29
emerging markets between 1981 and 2004, we calculate the total amount of new credit that private,
domestically–owned ﬁrms obtained on the bond market or from bank syndicates in each month.7
We then analyze how this aggregate measure of credit is aﬀected by currency crises, which we deﬁne
as large drops in real value of the currency. We do not restrict our analysis to the cases of currency
4This point was ﬁrst raised by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999).
5In fact, Bris and Koskinen (2002) in their model show that this eﬀect could be a reason for competitive devalu-
ations.
6This last eﬀect, however, is likely to be neutralized by the increased demand for foreign credit by domestic
ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
7We exclude from our analysis all the ﬁrms that are foreign–owned and all the ﬁrms that are owned by central or
local governments, which we would not be able to do with aggregate data.
3devaluations and collapses of the ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, because large currency depreciations
under ﬂoating exchange rate regimes may have similar eﬀects.8 We deﬁne currency crisis episodes
based on real, rather than nominal, depreciation to prevent hyperinﬂation periods from dominating
the sample.9
We construct a number of indicators that describe various aspects of each country’s economy
as well as factors that aﬀect the world supply of capital to emerging markets, which we use as
control variables. Since foreign credit to the country could be conditional on the country having an
agreement with the IMF, we include this indicator in our list of control variables. In addition, we
control for banking crises (Hutchison and Noy, 2005) and for debt crises (Arteta and Hale, 2006).
Using ﬁxed–eﬀect panel data regressions, we ﬁnd, not surprisingly, that there is a signiﬁcant decline
in credit to emerging market ﬁrms (measured either in U.S. dollars or in local currency) in the
aftermath of currency crises. We ﬁnd that foreign credit to the private sector falls by over 30%
compared to the country mean in the ﬁrst two years after a currency crisis and then recovers.
About a third of this decline in credit in the ﬁrst year and about half of the decline in the second
year are explained by the worsening of macroeconomic fundamentals and other control variables.
We ﬁnd that the decline in credit is most severe during the ﬁrst ﬁve months after the crisis and
that there is little or no evidence of a decline in credit prior to the currency crisis.
By separating demand factors from supply factors and using a proxy for the price of credit, we
are able to identify whether the decline in credit that we document comes from the demand or the
supply side. Because we do not have good exclusion restrictions for the supply equation, we assume
that supply of credit for each ﬁrm is perfectly elastic at a given price. Thus, our supply equation
is simply the price equation. We then estimate the demand equation without imposing restrictions
on its slope with respect to our measure of price.
At ﬁrst it appears that both demand and supply contribute equally to the decline in credit. However,
once we control for sovereign debt crises (Arteta and Hale, 2006), we ﬁnd that the decline in demand
for credit (which is large at 30%) only persists for ﬁve months, while the initial decline in the market
8We analyze separately devaluations and collapses of the pegs in our robustness tests and ﬁnd that the eﬀects of
this sub–sample of our events are larger than for the full sample, as one would expect.
9Using nominal depreciation leads to only minor changes in our set of currency crises and does not change our
results.
4value of bonds of over 20% recovers very gradually and is still statistically signiﬁcant and equal to
over 10% in the second year after the crisis. Given our estimate of the price elasticity of demand,
this decline in the market value of bonds translates to about 8% decline in credit initially and about
5% decline in credit in the second year. These results square well with our ﬁndings for the reduced
form — the initial large decline in credit is due to a reduction in both demand and supply, while
the persistent decline is due to the contraction in supply only.
We estimate a number of additional regressions as extensions and robustness tests and ﬁnd that the
above results are robust to the deﬁnition of dependent variable and the currency crisis indicator,
econometric model speciﬁcation, sample, and the set of control variables.
To summarize, we ﬁnd systematic evidence of a foreign credit crunch that is substantial and per-
sistent in the aftermath of currency crises. This foreign credit crunch is important as it extends to
the entire private sector of the economy, thus limiting the overall credit availability in the country.
In this way, our ﬁndings are consistent with the evidence presented in Desai, Foley, and Forbes
(forthcoming) and Blalock, Gertler, and Levine (2004). While we do ﬁnd an even larger decline in
demand for foreign credit, it only lasts for about ﬁve months after the crisis and therefore does not
contribute much to the creditless recovery phenomenon described in Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi
(2006).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Part two describes the empirical approach
of the paper and the data. Part three presents the results of the empirical analysis. Part four
concludes.
2 Empirical approach and data sources
We begin by analyzing the reduced–form speciﬁcation, which excludes the cost of credit. As we will
discuss later, estimating demand and supply eﬀects requires a proxy for the cost of credit, which
unfortunately limits our sample size. Using a longer sample period, as we do in the ﬁrst part of
our analysis, allows us to estimate the size and the persistence of the decline in foreign credit to
the private sector more precisely.
52.1 Reduced form speciﬁcation
To test for a decline in credit in the aftermath of a currency crisis, we estimate the following
reduced–form equation:
qit = αi + αt + β0 dit +
K X
τ=1
γτ zτit + X0
itη + εit, (1)
where qit is a measure of credit, αi is a set of country ﬁxed eﬀects absorbing the eﬀect of initial
conditions, αt is a set of year ﬁxed eﬀects absorbing the eﬀect of a common trend, dit is an indicator
of a currency crisis month, zτit is an indicator that the currency crisis occurred more than τ −1 but
less than τ years ago (we set K = 3), Xit is a set of all control variables, and εit is a set of robust
errors clustered on country. Speciﬁc deﬁnitions of all these variables are below. Data sources are
described in detail in the Appendix.
We estimate the above equation by ordinary least squares. In addition, to test for the robustness of
our results to the empirical speciﬁcation, we allow for autocorrelation in errors; we include a lagged
dependent variable on the right–hand side by itself and also interacted with country ﬁxed eﬀects; we
estimate a two–sided Tobit model by maximum likelihood; we estimate the above equation country
by country and obtain average β coeﬃcients. Some of these test results are reported below, and
the rest are described along with other robustness tests in Section 3.3.
The above speciﬁcation assumes that the decline in credit is constant throughout each year following
a currency crisis. It is, however, reasonable to expect that, at least in the ﬁrst year, the eﬀect
subsides gradually over time. In addition, there is a possibility that credit declines before the crisis
strikes, either because the currency crisis is expected or because of the exogenous sudden stop in
capital ﬂows (Calvo, 1998); in the latter case, the sudden stop would lead to a decline in credit to
the private sector and could also precipitate the currency crisis as foreign investors convert their
local currency assets to U.S. Dollars or other “hard” currency.
To estimate whether there is a dampening of the eﬀect in the ﬁrst year after the currency crisis,
we replace z1it with the mςit in the above regression, where mςit indicates that the currency crisis
occurred exactly ς months ago. We include up to 11 months in the regressions, since further eﬀects
6are captured by zτit, τ = 2,3. To test for the sudden stop eﬀects and expectations of currency
crises, we include 12 monthly leads in the regression as well.
2.2 Estimating demand and supply
We use a triangular identiﬁcation technique identify demand and supply, i.e., we assume that the
supply of credit for each country is perfectly elastic, due to competition between investors, and
therefore does not depend on the amount borrowed. We believe that this assumption is more
innocuous than any assumption we could make regarding exclusion restrictions from the supply
equation. On the other hand, we consider variables that are not likely to aﬀect the demand for
credit but aﬀect the supply of credit, as described below.
We estimate the following system using three–stage least squares for more robust estimates:














τ zτit + Xd0
itηd + εd
it, (3)
where pit is a measure of the cost of credit, Xs0
it is a set of control variables excluded from the
demand (or amount) equation, and Xd0
it is a set of controls that aﬀects both demand and supply of
credit.
We do not impose restrictions on λ but rather test whether it has the correct sign and yields a
downward–sloping demand.
2.3 Deﬁnition of a currency crisis: dit
For our exchange rate variable, we use JP Morgan’s Real Broad Eﬀective Exchange Rate (REER)
series.10 As Krugman (2001) points out, small amounts of currency depreciation do not lead to
changes in ﬁrms’ behavior. We therefore focus on episodes of large depreciations, which we deﬁne
as a monthly decline in the REER by over 10%. We choose 10% as a starting point, because it
10Using real exchange rate rather than nominal reduces the weight of hyperinﬂation episodes in our sample.
7represents just over 1% of the country–month observations and is about three standard deviations
over the mean change in the REER.11 Thus, our currency crisis episodes are rare.12
Since some of the countries in our sample experienced prolonged periods of currency depreciation,13
we observe sequences of months in which our depreciation episode indicator takes a value of one.
Since each of these sequences clearly represents one continuing currency crisis, we set our currency
crisis indicator to be equal to one in the ﬁrst of these months but not in subsequent months. We
allow for this indicator to take on a value of one again only after three consecutive months of REER
depreciation of less than 10%.14 Table 1 lists all 63 currency crisis episodes that are deﬁned in this
way, as well as the countries in our sample for which currency crisis have not occurred between
1981 and 2004, according to our deﬁnition. As Table 1 shows, our deﬁnition captures most “major”
ﬁnancial crises.
For most of the paper, we do not distinguish between devaluations, collapses of ﬁxed exchange
rate regimes, and large depreciation events during ﬂoating exchange rate regimes. As we discuss in
the robustness tests section, while devaluations tend to have larger eﬀects than depreciations, our
overall qualitative results are the same.
2.4 A measure of credit: qit
From Bondware and Loanware data sets, we gather all foreign bond issues and foreign syndicated
loan contracts obtained by emerging market ﬁrms between January 1981 and August 2004.15 Im-
portantly, these do not include trade credit.
For bonds issued through oﬀshore centers, we trace the true nationality of the borrowers by the
11We do not use a standard deviations measure due to diﬃculties in estimating the variance of the exchange rates,
which is not constant over time. We do not use the index proposed by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996),
because we are only interested in the eﬀects of real exchange rate changes rather than in the eﬀects of speculative
attacks. In particular, we do not include cases of failed attacks. We do control for reserves and interest rates; however,
they are not part of our crisis deﬁnition.
12We report the sensitivity of our results to both the choice of exchange rate data and the deﬁnition of the large
depreciation in the robustness tests section.
13See Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004) for the list of countries with periods of “free falling” currencies.
14Again, in the robustness tests section, we test whether our results are sensitive to this deﬁnition of the tranquil
period window.
15See Hale (2007) for the detailed description of these data sets. Bond data start in March 1991, because bond
markets for most emerging economies did not exist in the 1980s.
8location of their headquarters. We exclude all ﬁrms that are owned by the government or by
multinational or foreign companies.16 Most international bonds and loans are denominated in
some OECD country currency, therefore we ﬁrst convert the amounts into U.S. dollars according to
the average exchange rate in the issue month and then aggregate the amounts of bond issues and
of loans for each country–month. We drop from our analysis countries for which the total amount
of bonds and loans for both sectors was nonzero in fewer than 24 months out of 264 months in
our data sample. This ensures that we have enough identifying observations for each country and
leaves us with the 29 countries listed in Table 1.
We divide each amount by the U.S. consumer price index (CPI) to obtain the amount of credit for
each country–month in real dollars. We then construct our dependent variables as a percentage
deviation from the country–speciﬁc average for each of the sectors.17 Alternatively, we convert
the amounts to local currency using the average exchange rate vis-` a-vis U.S. dollars in a month of
issue, discount it by the local CPI, and then calculate percentage deviations from country–speciﬁc
means. Due to the high frequency of currency crises in some countries, we do not exclude crisis
periods from our means, which biases the means downward; therefore, the eﬀects we ﬁnd might be
underestimating the eﬀects of crises.
Importantly, our measure represents the ﬂuctuations in the gross borrowing of the emerging market
ﬁrms. We believe that this is a proper measure to analyze the access of these ﬁrms to credit. The
net measure would represent times when a lot of credit is being repaid as times of low access to
credit, which needs not be the case. Our robustness tests demonstrate that our results are robust
to controlling for principal and interest repayments as well as using a measure of net borrowing on
the left–hand side.
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of credit measured in U.S. dollars for the six major currency crises
of the 1990s.18 We can see that foreign credit to the private sector fell sharply after crises in Korea,
Russia, and Argentina. However, for the other three countries presented — Mexico, Brazil, and
16Desai, Foley, and Forbes (forthcoming) ﬁnd that multinationals expand their activities and credit as a result of
currency depreciation.
17We use percentage deviations from the country–speciﬁc sample means for all continuous variables. Diﬀerences in
means are captured by country ﬁxed eﬀects, while common trends are captured by year ﬁxed eﬀects. We do not use
percentage deviations from country–speciﬁc trnds, because removing trends may also remove the eﬀects of crises.
18For detailed description of credit data and its composition, see Arteta and Hale (2006) and Hale (2007).
9Turkey — the decline is not as evident. Of course, currency crises are accompanied by a number
of changes in the economy that can aﬀect foreign credit to the private sector. We control for these
changes in the regression analysis presented in the next part of the paper.
2.5 Cost of credit: pit
To estimate demand and supply equations separately, we need a measure of the cost of credit.
Unfortunately, Loanware and Bondware do not provide suﬃcient information on the pricing of
credit. They include spreads only for a small subset of loan contracts and bond issues and these
spreads are only primary — there is no information on secondary market pricing of credit. In
addition, the pricing of each individual loan or bond issue might be driven by speciﬁc characteristics
of the ﬁrms borrowing in a particular month. Since these characteristics are not available, pricing
information obtained by aggregating primary spreads will be aﬀected by the composition of the
ﬁrms that borrowed in a particular month and therefore will be noisy.
Secondary price data are available only for a small subset of the bonds and are also quite sparse.
For this reason, we resort to the JP Morgan country–speciﬁc EMBI Global Market Values Index
that combines spreads on private and sovereign foreign bonds. For cases when a country–speciﬁc
index is not available, we use the region–speciﬁc index.19 We use percentage deviations of the index
from country–speciﬁc averages. This index represents the price of country bonds on the secondary
market; as such, it is inversely related to the cost of credit. Thus, we expect the demand curve to
have a positive slope with respect to this price measure.
The EMBI Global indexes only go as far back as January 1994; therefore, our analysis of demand
and supply is limited to the 1994-2004 time period. However, we still capture the eﬀects of currency
crises that occurred up to two years prior to January 1994, which amounts to 25 currency crises
analyzed.
19We use the Middle East index for Bahrain and Saudi Arabia; the Asia index for Hong Kong, India, and Singapore;
the“Non-Latin” index for the Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia.
102.6 Demand and supply controls: Xd
it
The control variables are indexes that describe diﬀerent dimensions of the economy.20 In each case,
the variables are used as percentage deviations from their 25-year country–speciﬁc average from
1980 to 2004 on a monthly basis. All the indexes described below are lagged by one month because
we are not identifying the exact date of the currency crisis.21
Since many of the variables we would like to control for are highly correlated, we construct the
indexes using the method of principal components. Because a principal component is a linear
combination of the variables that enter it, in cases when some variables are missing, other weights
can be rescaled to compensate for missing variables. In this way, many of the gaps in the data
may be ﬁlled, which in our case of many missing observations is the main advantage of using these
indexes.
We group the variables in the following categories, summarized in Table 2. The Appendix provides
details on the construction of the indexes. For each of these indexes, we use only the ﬁrst principal
component in our estimation.
• International competitiveness. A country’s international competitiveness aﬀects the prof-
itability of ﬁrms in both the export and in the import–substitution sectors and therefore their
demand for credit. It also reﬂects a country’s ability to bring in enough foreign currency to
service its foreign debt and thus will aﬀect foreign investors’ interest in the country. The fol-
lowing variables are used to construct the index: terms of trade, change in current account,
index of the market prices of the country’s export commodities,22 and volatility of export
revenues. This index is scaled by a measure of trade openness — the ratio of trade volume
(sum of exports and imports) to GDP.
20We draw on the broad empirical literature on emerging market spreads to select our variables (Eichengreen, Hale,
and Mody, 2001; Eichengreen and Mody, 2000a; Eichengreen and Mody, 2000b; Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris, 2004;
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart, 1998; Mody, Taylor, and Kim, 2001).
21This turns out not to make much diﬀerence in our estimates compared to the case when they are not lagged or
when they are lagged by one year.
22Many emerging markets rely heavily on the export of a small number of commodities. We identify up to ﬁve of
these commodities (or commodity groups) for each country and merge these data with monthly commodity prices
from the Global Financial Data and the International Financial Statistics. For each commodity, we calculate monthly
percentage deviations from its 25-year average (1980-2004). For each country and each month, we construct the index
as a simple average of relevant deviations of commodity prices. If a country is exporting a variety of manufactured
goods and does not rely on commodity exports, this index is set to zero.
11• Investment climate and monetary stability. This index accounts for the short–run
macroeconomic situation in the country. It reﬂects the demand for investment, the availability
of domestic funds, and foreign investors’ interest in the country. This index is constructed
using the following variables: ratio of debt service to exports, ratio of investment to GDP,
real interest rate, ratio of lending interest rate to deposit interest rate, inﬂation rate, ratio of
domestic credit to GDP, and change in the domestic stock market index.
• Financial development. The level of development of the ﬁnancial market aﬀects domestic
funding opportunities for ﬁrms and, therefore, their demand for foreign credit. This index is
based on the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP, the ratio of commercial bank assets
to GDP, and the degree of ﬁnancial account openness, which reﬂects how easy it is for ﬁrms
to access foreign capital directly.
• Long–run macroeconomic prospects. The economy’s growth prospects aﬀect the invest-
ment demand of ﬁrms. This index is based on the ratio of total foreign debt to GDP, the
growth rate of real GDP, the growth rate of nominal GDP measured in U.S. dollars, and the
unemployment rate.
In addition to the indexes we include indicators for banking crises (Hutchison and Noy, 2005) and
for the sovereign debt crises as deﬁned by Arteta and Hale (2006). We combine renegotiations and
agreement indicators to create a single “debt crisis” indicator, which is equal to one either in the
month of the onset of renegotiations or in the month of debt restructuring that was not preceded
by a period of debt negotiations.
All of the above variables are included in reduced form, demand, and supply equations.
2.7 Supply controls: Xs
it
The following variables are included in the reduced form equation and in the supply (price) equation.
We believe that they do not directly aﬀect the demand for foreign funds by emerging market private
borrowers.
12Global supply of capital. This index reﬂects the availability of capital in general, changes in
investors’ risk attitude, and their willingness to provide capital to emerging markets. This index
is constructed on the basis of an investor conﬁdence index, the growth rate of the U.S. stock
market index, the U.S. Treasury rate, the volume of gross international capital outﬂows from
OECD countries, and Merrill Lynch High Yield Spreads. All variables are presented as percentage
deviations from their 25–year averages. Two principal components are retained and capture 65%
of the variance. This index is not country–speciﬁc and therefore does not aﬀect an individual
country’s changes in its demand for credit.
Some creditors are not able or willing to lend to the countries that do not have an IMF agreement
in place; therefore, the supply of credit to these countries can be adversely aﬀected, especially in
the aftermath of ﬁnancial crises. We use the variable that is equal to one if either a stand–by or
an extended funds facility is in place for each month for a given country. Since the IMF funding
is extended to sovereigns, they might aﬀect sovereign demand for funds from commercial creditors,
but are not likely to aﬀect private demand for foreign credit directly.
3 Empirical ﬁndings
We ﬁrst analyze whether there is a reduction in credit due to currency crises as deﬁned above and
then analyze demand and supply eﬀects separately. We ﬁrst focus on the long run — including
our main explanatory variable for up to three years. We then repeat the analysis with monthly
indicators of the event. The coeﬃcients in the regressions are easy to interpret: Since the dependent
variable (amount of credit) is deﬁned as a percentage deviation from the mean, the coeﬃcients on
binary variables indicate the percentage change (relative to the mean) of the dependent variable if
the indicator value switches from 0 to 1.
3.1 Reduced form results
The results of the reduced form analysis that tests for a decline in credit in the aftermath of a
currency crisis are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 reports the results for the regressions
with credit measured in U.S. dollars, while Table 4 reports the results with credit measured in
13the country’s local currency. Since most of the costs that ﬁrms incur are in local currency, while
foreign credit is usually denominated in a foreign currency, ﬁrms might reduce their demand for
foreign credit when measured in dollars, while borrowing the same amount in local currency. Since
most borrowing occurs in the foreign currency, we translate borrowing into local currency using the
average exchange rate for each month, and then discount the measure by the local CPI.23 It turns
out that the decline in credit following a currency crisis is roughly the same whether it is measured
in U.S. dollars or in local currency. We proceed with a detailed discussion of the results in Table 3
and merely point out any diﬀerences that arise in Table 4.
In Table 3, the dependent variable is the percentage deviation in the foreign credit measured in
U.S. dollars received by the private sector. The ﬁrst three columns report the results of our baseline
speciﬁcation, while the last three present alternative econometric speciﬁcations. In particular, we
are concerned that borrowing by a given country could be correlated over time, which would lead to
incorrect estimates of the variance–covariance matrix and therefore incorrect standard errors. We
address this issue in columns (4) and (5). We are also concerned that our left–hand side variables
are truncated at -100 on the left and +100 on the right, thus, in column (6), we estimate a Tobit
regression.
• Column (1) presents the results that are obtained without including any of the control vari-
ables described in the previous section. We can see that, if we do not control for fundamentals,
the decline in credit after currency crises events is large — over 30% in the ﬁrst two years
after the event, only subsiding in the third year. If measured in local currency, the credit
declines even more, by over 40% in the ﬁrst year.
• Column (2) includes our control variables, except for the eﬀects of debt crisis. We can see
that the eﬀect of currency crises is now smaller, suggesting that some of the decline in credit
we observed in the ﬁrst column is due to worsening fundamentals. However, the remaining
eﬀect is still large (over 25%) and signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst year.24 Therefore, it appears that,
23Prices tend to adjust quite slowly after currency crises (Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2002; Burstein,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2005), thus our “real local currency” measure of credit is quite diﬀerent from the one
measured in dollars. We are using the average rather than end–of–period exchange rate for two reasons: we are
converting the ﬂow of borrowing that occurred throughout the month; end–of–period exchange rate is more likely to
be aﬀected by noise trading than average exchange rate.
24One must note, however, that the diﬀerences in coeﬃcients across speciﬁcations are not statistically signiﬁcant.
14conditional on fundamentals, credit recovers faster than the fundamentals themselves. The
same is true if credit is measured in local currency.
• As shown in column (3), the eﬀects of currency crises decline further if we control for the
eﬀects of sovereign debt crises, but not by much.
• In column (4), we allow for errors to be correlated over time and ﬁnd that the correlation
coeﬃcient is less than 0.10 and that the rest of our results are almost identical to those
in column (3). One exception is that now the decline in credit in the second year after a
currency crisis becomes signiﬁcant, which is due to a reduction in the standard error — the
point estimate remains the same.
• In column (5), we include a lagged dependent variable interacted with country ﬁxed eﬀects,
thus allowing for a diﬀerent persistence of deviations in credit from the mean in diﬀerent
countries.25 Again, our baseline results are not aﬀected — the coeﬃcients of interest are
now smaller, but due to the lagged dependent variable on the right–hand side, they are not
directly comparable with the baseline model.
• In column (6), we estimate a Tobit regression with truncation points at -100 and +100. Again,
the magnitudes of coeﬃcients in this regression are not directly comparable to the baseline
model. Nevertheless, we observe the same pattern qualitatively.
While it is diﬃcult to discuss the signs of the coeﬃcients on our indexes, we can see that the
coeﬃcients on other controls, IMF agreements, banking crises and debt crises, are of the expected
sign and are statistically signiﬁcant.
In what follows, we use the speciﬁcation in column (3) of Table 3 as a baseline. Since the borrowing
takes place in foreign currency and it appears that measuring it in local currency does not make
a diﬀerence, in the following regressions our dependent variable is a percentage change in foreign
credit to the private sector measured in U.S. dollars.
To analyze how fast the eﬀect of currency crises wears out, we re–estimate the regression in column
(3) of Table 3 with monthly rather than annual dummy variables for the lagged eﬀects of currency
25In a separate regression we include only the lagged dependent variable, without interactions. The results are very
similar and are not reported.
15crises. We also include 12-month leads to control for simultaneity and expected currency crises.
The estimates and their individual 5% conﬁdence intervals are presented on Figure 2. We can see
that the decline in credit seems to last for two years, which is conﬁrmed by the F–test, presented
below the graph, although it is larger in the ﬁrst ﬁve months after the currency crisis. We also
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant decline of about 15% before the currency crisis, suggesting that either a currency
crisis is expected or there is a sudden stop in capital ﬂows that both reduces credit and leads to
a currency crisis.26 In the latter case, there is still an independent eﬀect of the currency crisis as
credit declines further after a currency crisis occurs.
3.2 Demand and supply eﬀects
We now turn to demand and supply eﬀects. Since we discovered that there is some decline in credit
in the three months prior to a currency crisis, we include an indicator for three months before the
event. In addition, we split the eﬀects of the ﬁrst year into two half–year indicators to analyze
how fast the eﬀects subside.27 The results are presented in Table 5. The number of observations is
smaller because price data only go back to 1994.
First we note, reassuringly, that the coeﬃcient on the price in the demand equation (labelled
“Amount”) is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Since the price is measured as a market value of
the debt, it is the inverse of the cost of credit, and therefore we would expect the demand for credit
to depend positively on the market value of debt. Our estimated elasticity of demand suggests
that a 10% increase in the market value of the debt would increase the demand for credit by 3-4%.
Moreover, the decline in the market value of the debt means an increase in the cost of borrowing
and thus can be interpreted as a decline in the supply of credit.
In Model 1, presented in columns (1) and (2), the supply equation, labelled “Price,” does not
include the controls for fundamentals. As column (1) shows, we observe a large decline in the
market value of the debt that persists for two years, with a decline of over 20% in the ﬁrst year and
over 10% in the second year. Once we control for fundamentals (Model 2, column(3)), we ﬁnd that
26We address this simultaneity problem in the robustness tests section.
27Including instead the same set of dummy variables as in Table 4 gives us the same results. We proceed with the
more detailed period dummies, however, because they give us more information.
16a reduction in the supply of credit is partly due to worsening fundamentals: the decline in credit
is now about 16% in the second part of the ﬁrst year. However, it is still persistent.
In both Models 1 and 2, we observe a dramatic decline in the demand for credit, on the order of
40% in the ﬁrst ﬁve months after a currency crisis. However, this demand eﬀect is very short–lived
— it is only borderline signiﬁcant in the next half a year, and is no longer statistically signiﬁcant
in the second year in both models.
Controlling for the eﬀects of debt crisis, Model 3 does not bring about many changes, especially
in the supply regression (column (5)). Once we control for the eﬀects of debt crises, we can see
even more clearly that the decline in demand for credit does not persist after the ﬁrst ﬁve months
following the currency crisis.
We can also see in these regressions that neither a decline in supply nor a decline in demand
are statistically signiﬁcant in the three months prior to the currency crisis. This observation is
reassuring in the sense that simultaneity due to sudden stops does not appear important, as we
verify in the robustness tests.
Thus, we can conclude from this section that we indeed observe a credit crunch in the aftermath
of currency crises, which is consistent with the view that balance sheets worsen due to currency
depreciation. This ﬁnding provides a potential explanation for the decline in investment associated
with currency crises.
3.3 Robustness tests and further analysis
In this section we conduct some additional tests. The results are not reported but can be obtained
from the authors upon request.
Deﬁnition of a currency crisis
First of all, we test whether our results are sensitive to the deﬁnition of the a currency crisis.
We construct a variable for currency crisis based on the bilateral exchange rate vis-a-vis the U.S.
and the CPI in the U.S. and the country of interest. Not surprisingly, the set of events we deﬁne
17through the use of this variable is almost identical to the one presented in Table 1 and therefore
all the results remain the same. We also alter the length of the tranquil period required before the
new crisis can occur, which we initially set to three months. Setting it to one, two, or four months
only alters our set of crises very slightly and therefore does not aﬀect the results of the regression
analysis.
Next, we re–estimate all our models with a new threshold for the change in the REER set to
15% (39 episodes in our sample). We ﬁnd very similar results to our baseline speciﬁcation for
our reduced–form and supply equations, while the decline in demand in the regression reported
in column (6) of Table 5 is no longer signiﬁcant, even in the ﬁrst ﬁve months after the currency
crisis. Overall, the basic message of the paper and the estimated magnitudes of the decline in credit
remain unchanged.
We re–estimate our model by replacing the currency crisis indicators with a continuous variable
that measures the percentage change in the REER in each month. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects
of this variable, whether contemporaneous or lagged, in a reduced–form speciﬁcation or in the
demand equation, which suggests that our results are indeed driven by currency crises. We do ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant decline in the supply of credit due to contemporaneous or lagged real depreciation.
This ﬁnding is consistent with our evidence of the credit crunch.
We also re–estimate our model by separating those depreciation episodes that were devaluations or
switches from a preannounced peg to a ﬂoating regime from those that were depreciations under
ﬂoat. We ﬁnd that the decline in credit occurs in both cases but is larger and more persistent in the
case of a regime switch.28 We further ﬁnd that, while the decline in the supply of credit is observed
in the aftermath of both types of currency crises, which is again consistent with the balance–sheet–
driven credit crunch, the decline in demand for credit only occurs after regime switches.
Dual debt–currency crises
28We use Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004) exchange rate classiﬁcation to determine regime switch. In particular, we
deﬁne a regime switch as a change from a peg to a free–falling regime.
18In our treatment of currency crises and debt crises as separate events, we implicitly assume that
when the two occur at the same time, their eﬀects are additive. To test whether this assumption
is appropriate, we create the indicators to describe three types of crises: dual crises (deﬁned as
currency crises and debt crises occurring within three months of each other), currency crises not
accompanied by debt crises, and debt crises not accompanied by currency crises. We ﬁnd 23 dual
crises in our overall sample and only three crises in the sample for which we can analyze demand
and supply.
Consistent with our ﬁndings here and in Arteta and Hale (2006), we ﬁnd that credit declines by
about 25% in the ﬁrst year and by 15% in the second year after the currency crisis, and by 30%
for over two years after the debt crisis. However, when the crises occur at the same time, credit
declines by about 35% in the ﬁrst year and about 25% in the second year. Furthermore, the decline
in credit due to a credit crunch appears to be almost exactly additive: in the ﬁrst year after a
currency crisis, the decline in supply is about 20%, in the ﬁrst year after a debt crisis, it is about
10%, and in the ﬁrst year after a dual crisis, it is 29%. The decline in demand for credit after dual
crises, on the other hand, appears to be driven mostly by the debt crises, which have a larger eﬀect
on demand.29
Measure of credit
Since our measure of ﬂuctuations in credit is constructed from microlevel data, we might be
missing an important chunk of the private sector borrowing. From the World Bank’s Global De-
velopment Finance (GDF) we gathered the series on private nonguaranteed disbursements and
repayments (of principal and interest). Unfortunately, the GDF series are only of annual fre-
quency. We compared the gross disbursement series to our total amount borrowed, aggregated by
year, and found that they are very similar, with an overall correlation coeﬃcient of 0.63 and a mean
about twice as large as our measure.
First, we replicated our results using the percentage deviation from the country mean in gross
disbursements, deﬂated by U.S. CPI (sum of bonds and bank loans). We ﬁnd that both the
29These latter results should be interpreted with care, of course, since in this shorter time period we only have
three dual crises.
19reduced–form and the demand–supply results are completely unaﬀected by the use of this measure
instead of the original one. Because the GDF measure does not vary month–to–month and because
we lose ﬁve countries for which GDF data are not available, some of the coeﬃcients are estimated
less precisely. However, the coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant in our benchmark regressions remain
signiﬁcant with the alternative measure of credit.
Next, we test whether our results are sensitive to using a measure of net borrowing (disbursements
minus repayments), rather than gross borrowing. We construct the measure of percentage devia-
tions from net borrowing in the same way as above and use it as our dependent variable. In the
reduced–form regression, the only change is that there is no longer a reduction in credit two years
after a currency crisis. The coeﬃcient now is small and positive, although, as before, it is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In the demand–supply regressions, we ﬁnd that the supply results
are not aﬀected (this is not surprising, since nothing is altered in the supply equation), while the
decline in demand in the ﬁrst ﬁve months after a currency crisis is a lot larger (about 60%), persists
for the next six months (a 20% decline), and is reversed to 20% increase in demand in the second
year. Not only does this suggest that ﬁrms do not demand as much credit after currency crises,
but also that they increase their repayments of existing debt in the ﬁrst year after crises.
To investigate this further, we revert to using the original measure of credit on the left–hand side
and add a measure of repayment (in percentage changes from the country mean) as a control
variable. We ﬁnd that our reduced–form results are largely unaﬀected, while a 1% in repayment
increases borrowing by 0.12%. In the demand-supply model, where we include the measure of
repayment in both equations, both supply and demand are basically unaﬀected, while 1% increase
in repayment increases the price of bonds by 0.12% and lowers the demand for credit by 0.14%.
Other tests
We are concerned about the simultaneity problem that could arise due to sudden stops in capital
ﬂows (Calvo, 1998). We now include the indicator for a sudden stop year in our regressions to see
whether our results are robust to such a control. Since a simple sudden stop indicator would be
endogenous with respect to our left–hand side variable, we use a “systemic sudden stop” indicator
20constructed by Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006) that relies less on country–speciﬁc information.
For the countries not covered in Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006), we use the sudden stop indi-
cator from Frankel and Cavallo (2004). We ﬁnd that adding such an indicator does not alter our
coeﬃcients of interest at all. Moreover, the sudden stop indicator does not enter signiﬁcantly in our
supply equation, while it enters positively in our reduced form and demand equation, suggesting
that endogeneity of this indicator can indeed be a problem.
To see whether the development of the emerging markets’ international bond market in the early
1990s had an important eﬀect, and because private foreign credit was less important in the 1980s,
we re–estimate the regressions in Table 4, splitting the sample into 1980-1989 and 1990-2004 time
periods. We ﬁnd that the decline in credit in the 1980s (32 episodes of currency crises) was less
than 10% and only lasted one year, while the decline in the 1990s (31 episodes) was about 28%
in the ﬁrst year and 17% in the second year.30 This leads us to suspect that our results might be
driven mainly by bond issuance. Thus, we re–estimate our model with just the loans and just the
bond issuance on the left–hand side. We ﬁnd, however, that our main results are driven primarily
by the loan market, as the decline in bond credit is smaller and not statistically signiﬁcant.31
We were interested in estimating whether all the sectors are equally aﬀected by the currency crises.
In contrast to the eﬀects of debt crises that are diﬀerent for ﬁnancial, exporting, and non–exporting
sectors (Arteta and Hale, 2006), we ﬁnd that the eﬀects of currency crises are roughly the same
across these sectors.
We re–estimated our model adding 12-month ﬁxed eﬀects to control for any possible seasonality.
While we ﬁnd that credit in the months of January and February tends to be lower, this eﬀect does
not change our results.
When the political situation in a country is unstable, it introduces uncertainty and leads to a de-
cline in ﬁrms’ investment and their demand for credit; furthermore, it may lead to foreign investors’
concerns about their ability to collect their assets in the future. We used the measure of political
risk from the International Country Risk Guide to account for this. While this index does enter
signiﬁcantly with the correct sign in most regressions, it does not aﬀect our qualitative or quan-
30Our demand and supply estimation is limited to the sample of 1994-2004 due to price data availability.
31This is not a surprise given a much smaller number of bond issues compared to loan contracts.
21titative conclusions. However, it does limit our sample size and therefore reduces the signiﬁcance
level of some coeﬃcients.
We experimented with lagging our indexes by 3, 6, and 12 months and found that while the
coeﬃcients on indexes do change, our main results are not aﬀected.
Finally, given the large degree of heterogeneity in the data, we re–estimated the model by estimat-
ing time–series regressions for each country and taking a simple average of the coeﬃcients across
countries. The coeﬃcients of interest obtained in this manner are very close to those we estimate
in our ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations, thus conﬁrming that the eﬀects we ﬁnd are indeed systematic and
robust.
4 Conclusion
We analyze a data set built on the ﬁrm–level data in order to examine the eﬀects of currency crises
on the foreign credit to the private sector. Controlling for fundamentals and the eﬀects of sovereign
debt crises, we ﬁnd that foreign credit to the private sector declines by about 25% in the ﬁrst year
after a currency crisis, and that this decline is especially large in the ﬁrst ﬁve months after the
crisis. This decline is persistent, substantial, and robust.
We ﬁnd that both demand and supply of credit take a substantial hit after currency crises. However,
only the decline in supply is persistent and lasts for over two years, while the decline in demand,
although large in the ﬁrst ﬁve months after a crisis, wears out quickly. These results are consistent
with the view that currency crises lead to balance–sheet eﬀects that in turn can worsen credit
rationing: Since balance–sheet problems take a while to resolve, the decline in supply of credit is
persistent.
Thus, we provide evidence that may help explain the large scale of economic downturn as well as
the decline in investment activity in the aftermath of currency crises.
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25Appendix
Indexes
The indexes were constructed using the full sample with weights zero assigned to missing variables. Here
we present the linear combinations of the variables that are our indexes. All the variables enter as their
percentage deviations from the country–speciﬁc means in a standardized form, which renders them unit–free
and comparable.
Index 1 = (−0.60 ∗ TOT + 0.013 ∗ ˙ CA + 0.68 ∗ EPI + 0.30 ∗ V OLT) ∗ TO,
where
TOT Terms of Trade Up = Improvement
˙ CA Change in CA Up = Improvement
EPI Export Price Index Up = Increase
V OLT Trade Volatility Up = Increase
TO Trade Openness (EX+IM)/GDP Up = Increase
Index 2 = 0.033 ∗ SCR + 0.053 ∗ DS/EX − 0.67 ∗ I/Y + 0.19 ∗ RIR
−0.16 ∗ LR/DR − 0.045 ∗ INFL + 0.70 ∗ DC/Y + 0.0015 ∗ ˙ SI
where
SCR Sovereign Credit Risk Up = Lower risk
DS/EX Debt Service/Exports Up = Increase
I/Y Investment/GDP Up = Increase
RIR Real Interest Rate Up = Increase
LR/DR Lending Rate/Deposit Rate Up = Increase
INFL Inﬂation Rate Up = Increase
DC/Y Domestic Credit/GDP Up = Increase
˙ SI Change in Stock Market Index Up = Increase
Index 3 = 0.60 ∗ OPEN + 0.55 ∗ BA + 0.58 ∗ SM
where
OPEN Financial Account Openness Up = More open
BA Commercial Bank Assets/GDP Up = Increase
SM Stock Market Capitalization/GDP Up = Increase
Index 4 = 0.40 ∗ FD/Y + 0.61 ∗ ˆ Y − 0.50 ∗ ˆ PY + 0.46 ∗ U,
where
FD/Y Foreign Debt/GDP UP = Increase
ˆ Y Growth Rate of Real GDP Up = Increase
ˆ PY Growth Rate of GDP in US Dollars Up = Increase
U Unemployment Rate Up = Increase
Index 5.1 = −0.60 ∗ CO + 0.34 ∗ CI + 0.39 ∗ TR + 0.59 ∗ HY + 0.16 ∗ ˆ USSI,
Index 5.2 = 0.37 ∗ CO + 0.62 ∗ CI + 0.55 ∗ TR − 0.38 ∗ HY + 0.18 ∗ ˆ USSI,
where
26CO Gross Capital Outﬂows from OECD Up = Increase
CI Investor Conﬁdence Index Up = More conﬁdence
TR U.S. Treasury Rate Up = Increase
HY ML High Yield Spread Up = Increase
ˆ USSI Growth Rate of U.S. Stock Market Index Up = Increase
Data formats and sources
Variable Frequency Units Source
Real eﬀective exchange rate monthly Index JP Morgan — Bloomberg series JBXR*
Primary bond issues by issue #, U.S.$ Bondware
spread by issue bp Bondware
maturity by issue years Bondware
Syndicated loan contracts by contract #, U.S.$ Loanware
spread by contract bp Loanware
maturity by contract years Loanware
Terms of trade annual index UNCTAD
Current account monthly U.S.$ IFS line 78al
Real exchange rate monthly index IFS line rec
Export commodity prices monthly index Authors’ calculations (see text)
Exchange rate regime monthly list Reinhart & Rogoﬀ (2004)
Exports monthly n.c.units IFS line 90c
Imports monthly n.c.units IFS line 98c
GDP monthly n.c.units IFS line 99b, GFD
Debt service monthly U.S.$ Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-WB data
Investment monthly n.c.units IFS line 93e
Lending rate monthly percent IFS line 60p
Deposit rate monthly percent IFS line 60l
CPI inﬂation rate monthly percent IFS line 64x
Nominal exchange rate monthly n.c./U.S.$ IFS line
Domestic credit monthly n.c.units IFS line
Sovereign credit rating monthly index S&P, Moody’s, EIU
Stock market indexes monthly index Ibbotson, GFD, Bloomberg
Stock market cap. monthly n.c.units GFD
Comm. banks assets monthly n.c.units IFS lines 20-22
Capital access annual index Milken Institute
Fin. account openness annual index IMF, Glick and Hutchison (2005)
Total foreign debt quarterly U.S.$ Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-WB data
Industrial production monthly index WB
Unemployment rate monthly percent IFS line 67r, GFD
Investor conﬁdence monthly index Yale SOM
U.S. stock market index monthly index GFD
U.S. Treasury rate monthly percent Federal Reserve
Gross capital outﬂows monthly U.S.$ Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (1999)
EMBI index monthly index J.P.Morgan/Bloomberg
IMF program monthly binary IMF web site
Banking crisis indicator annual binary Hutchison and Noy (2005)
Systemic sudden stop monthly binary Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006)
Sudden stop annual binary Frankel and Cavallo (2004)
Debt restructuring indicators monthly binary Arteta and Hale (2006)
Note: See text for description of Bondware and Loanware, GDF is World Bank’s Global Development Fi-
nance, IFS is International Financial Statistics, GFD is Global Financial Data, EIU is Economist Intelligence
Unit, ICRG is International Country Risk Data.
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Each point on a thick line represents a β-coeﬃcient on the appropriate lead or lag of the currency
crisis indicator where the dependent variable is total amount borrowed by private sector in
percentage deviations from country–speciﬁc means. All control variables are included. Thin lines
represent 95% conﬁdence interval for each β-coeﬃcient.
F–tests:
Prob(total eﬀect in 3 months before is zero) = 0.03
Prob(total eﬀect in 5 months after is zero) = 0.009
Prob(total eﬀect in month 6 to 24 after is zero) = 0.09
29Table 1: Currency crises in the sample
Country Year Month Country Year Month
Argentina 1981 4 Philippines 1983 10
Argentina 1982 1, 5, 11 Philippines 1986 2
Argentina 1984 11 Romania 1997 1
Argentina 1985 7 Russia 1994 10
Argentina 1989 4, 12 Russia 1998 8
Argentina 1991 1 South Africa 1984 7
Argentina 2002 1 South Africa 1985 1, 8
Brazil 1983 2 South Africa 1986 6
Brazil 1990 4, 10 South Africa 1998 7
Brazil 1999 1 South Africa 2001 12
China 1994 1 Thailand 1984 11
Egypt 2003 2 Thailand 1997 7
India 1991 7 Thailand 1998 1
India 1993 3 Turkey 1994 2
Indonesia 1983 4 Turkey 2001 3
Indonesia 1986 9 Venezuela 1984 2
Indonesia 1997 10 Venezuela 1986 12
Indonesia 1998 5 Venezuela 1989 3
Indonesia 1999 8 Venezuela 1994 5
Korea 1997 12 Venezuela 1995 12
Mexico 1982 2, 8, 12 Venezuela 1996 4
Mexico 1985 8 Venezuela 2002 2
Mexico 1994 12 Venezuela 2003 1




Peru 1989 2, 7
Peru 1990 8
Peru 1991 5 Total crises: 63
Countries included in the sample that did not experience a crisis:
Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Hungary,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia
30Table 2: Summary of indexes
Concept Variables Shifting Notes Indexes
International Terms of trade Demand Scaled by trade 1
competitiveness Change in CA Supply openness
Export commodity prices
Volatility of export revenues
Investment climate and Debt service/Exports Demand Lagged 1 month 2





Change in stock market index
Financial development Stock market cap./GDP Demand Lagged 1 month 3
Comm. bank assets/GDP Supply
Financial account openness
Long-run macroeconomic Foreign debt/GDP Demand Lagged 1 month 4
prospects Growth rate of real GDP Supply
Growth rate of GDP in USD
Unemployment rate
Global supply of capital Investor conﬁdence index Supply Not lagged 5.1
Growth rate of U.S. stock mkt. index 5.2
U.S. Treasury rate
Gross capital outﬂows from OECD
ML High Yield Spread
31Table 3: Eﬀects of currency crises on total amount borrowed (U.S. dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Month of crisis -32.71** -24.11* -24.79** -21.93* -17.39* -55.35**
(13.58) (12.71) (12.33) (13.23) (10.53) (24.83)
Year 1 since crisis -36.77*** -26.30** -25.91** -25.70*** -18.96** -43.94***
(11.77) (11.01) (10.28) (5.78) (7.82) (9.36)
Year 2 since crisis -30.51** -17.22 -14.12 -14.02** -8.78 -27.52***
(12.14) (11.68) (11.41) (6.20) (9.06) (9.74)
Year 3 since crisis -10.02 2.03 5.00 5.50 10.03 3.25
(9.89) (9.97) (10.29) (6.56) (8.15) (10.13)
Index 1 -7.69 -6.91 -7.74 2.58 -14.07
(26.61) (26.26) (12.51) (22.13) (17.51)
Index 2 4.41 2.25 2.39* 1.72 12.24***
(2.82) (2.48) (1.38) (2.04) (2.50)
Index 3 4.71** 4.34* 3.68*** 3.43 5.73***
(2.37) (2.41) (1.02) (2.37) (1.62)
Index 4 2.45** 2.21** 2.24** 1.73** 3.65**
(0.97) (0.91) (1.04) (0.81) (1.72)
Index 5.1 -14.94*** -15.11*** -14.29*** -14.92*** -19.90**
(5.52) (5.45) (5.29) (5.22) (8.29)
Index 5.2 11.44*** 12.10*** 10.97*** 11.23*** 14.05**
(4.37) (4.44) (3.82) (4.23) (6.07)
IMF agreement indicator -19.12*** -14.19** -14.12*** -12.55** -15.54**
(6.75) (6.03) (3.77) (5.41) (6.09)
Banking crisis indicator -14.24 -13.17 -13.42*** -13.52* -30.85***
(10.03) (9.96) (4.97) (7.73) (7.67)
Debt crisis -29.51** -28.80*** -28.03** -73.25***
(13.66) (10.93) (13.21) (21.12)
Year 1 since debt crisis -31.24*** -30.71*** -30.27*** -67.83***
(9.07) (4.99) (8.94) (8.34)
Year 2 since debt crisis -31.42*** -30.32*** -29.29*** -58.83***
(8.18) (5.52) (8.38) (8.96)
Observations 7850 6240 6240 6212 5975 6240
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.15 0.21
AR(1) ρ 0.095
Dependent variable: total amount borrowed (USD) in percentage deviations from the mean.
Robust standard errors clustered on country are in parentheses (except (4),(6)).
Year and country ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
OLS in columns (1)-(3),(5); ML in (4),(6).
(5) includes lagged dependent variable interacted with country ﬁxed eﬀects. (6) is Tobit.
32Table 4: Eﬀects of currency crises on total amount borrowed (local currency)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Month of crisis -25.54 -8.82 -10.40 -8.53 -20.12 -46.06
(21.12) (18.38) (19.17) (21.34) (12.91) (28.44)
Year 1 since crisis -40.45*** -25.93* -26.22* -26.06*** -24.16*** -49.53***
(14.03) (13.81) (13.53) (8.73) (8.83) (10.48)
Year 2 since crisis -34.10** -21.13 -19.38 -19.21** -15.06* -37.62***
(14.38) (13.51) (13.52) (9.08) (8.86) (10.59)
Year 3 since crisis -6.70 2.94 5.18 5.43 6.19 -4.05
(14.59) (14.72) (14.72) (9.52) (9.24) (10.89)
Index 1 -24.84 -23.19 -23.28 -13.25 -29.55
(24.64) (24.24) (19.16) (27.00) (19.96)
Index 2 5.99** 4.27 4.33** 1.04 13.28***
(3.01) (2.72) (2.02) (2.17) (2.67)
Index 3 5.59* 5.34* 4.83*** 3.71 7.21***
(2.98) (3.07) (1.47) (2.51) (1.71)
Index 4 2.88** 2.48** 2.50* 2.22** 3.38*
(1.32) (1.21) (1.48) (0.89) (1.81)
Index 5.1 -21.21*** -21.68*** -21.19*** -14.88*** -23.84***
(7.62) (7.69) (7.68) (5.56) (8.81)
Index 5.2 17.94*** 18.46*** 17.72*** 11.91*** 19.43***
(5.77) (5.85) (5.60) (4.22) (6.40)
IMF agreement indicator -19.86** -15.67** -15.57*** -14.81*** -18.42***
(8.61) (7.80) (5.47) (5.56) (6.56)
Banking crisis indicator -18.01 -15.69 -16.09** -8.44 -26.77***
(12.18) (12.67) (7.45) (8.14) (8.70)
Debt crisis -16.73 -16.78 -23.98 -47.74**
(17.90) (17.02) (16.13) (23.04)
Year 1 since debt crisis -25.71* -25.20*** -30.19*** -58.35***
(13.25) (7.25) (10.10) (9.00)
Year 2 since debt crisis -36.72*** -36.48*** -28.73*** -63.15***
(12.55) (7.97) (8.71) (9.65)
Observations 7050 6121 6121 6093 5825 6121
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.16
AR(1) ρ 0.095
Dependent variable: total amount borrowed (loc.cur.) in percentage deviations from the mean.
Robust standard errors clustered on country are in parentheses (except (4),(6)).
Year and country ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
OLS in columns (1)-(3),(5); ML in (4),(6).
(5) includes lagged dependent variable interacted with country ﬁxed eﬀects. (6) is Tobit.
33Table 5: Eﬀects of currency crises on demand and supply of funds
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Price Amount Price Amount Price Amount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price 0.46*** 0.44*** 0.31*
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
1-3 months before crisis -7.55 -26.57 -5.57 -26.29 -3.59 -16.01
(7.50) (23.91) (7.22) (23.89) (7.21) (23.69)
Month of crisis -19.06* -11.86 -18.94** -12.00 -18.25* -0.88
(9.97) (31.78) (9.62) (31.76) (9.67) (31.67)
1-5 months since crisis -26.45*** -41.15*** -23.65*** -41.81*** -23.26*** -34.00**
(4.80) (15.32) (4.81) (15.31) (4.84) (15.33)
6-12 months since crisis -22.64*** -22.59 -16.13*** -23.75* -16.35*** -16.78
(4.27) (14.07) (4.54) (14.07) (4.54) (14.00)
Year 2 since crisis -11.61*** -14.68 -11.38*** -14.63 -11.48*** -8.22
(3.42) (10.45) (3.39) (10.45) (3.38) (10.39)
Index 1 -8.33 -33.82*** -0.13 -33.36*** -1.19
(20.53) (7.19) (20.58) (7.17) (20.33)
Index 2 3.80 7.49*** 2.88 7.16*** 5.10*
(2.97) (1.12) (2.97) (1.13) (2.95)
Index 3 3.36** 3.55*** 2.51 3.47*** 2.56
(1.64) (0.54) (1.64) (0.54) (1.63)
Index 4 -1.42 -2.91*** -1.22 -3.68*** -6.23**
(2.74) (0.95) (2.75) (0.96) (2.82)
Index 5.1 3.22*** 2.78*** 2.87***
(0.58) (0.57) (0.57)
Index 5.2 19.36*** 17.99*** 17.12***
(1.04) (1.08) (1.09)
IMF agreement indicator 28.34*** 27.28*** 27.07***
(2.69) (2.64) (2.64)
Banking crisis indicator -18.34 18.55*** -21.94* 19.67*** -17.32
(12.26) (3.29) (12.27) (3.29) (12.15)
Debt crisis -4.98 -49.59*
(9.32) (29.62)
Year 1 since debt crisis -11.13*** -51.08***
(3.56) (9.81)
Year 2 since debt crisis -11.02*** -40.57***
(3.11) (9.80)
Observations 1967 1967 1967 1967 1967 1967
Country ﬁxed eﬀects Yes No Yes No Yes No
Year ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1967 1967 1967 1967 1967 1967
Three–stage least squares estimates
Dependent variables (in percentage deviation from the mean):
Price = the value of EMBI; Amount = Total amount borrowed (USD)
Robust standard errors clustered on country are in parentheses.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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